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NOTES AND COMMENTS ON RECENT
DECISIONS.
DECEDENTS' ESTATES.
.Demonstrative or specific legacy.
Questions as to whether a legacy is demonstrative or specific
.are often very difficult to answer. An illustration of this will
be found in the case In re Pratt, L. R. (1894) I Ch. 491.
-Tesfatrix bequeathed to her nephew "8oo pounds invested in
2/ consols," she did not have at the date of the will any 2Y2
consuls, but had 18oo pounds 23Y consols in the name of her
-deceased husband and herself.
It was contended that the case was exactly covered by
.Mytton v. Mytton, L. R. 19 Eq. 30, where the words were
"the sum of 3000 pounds invested in Indian security," and the
legacy was" held to be demonstrative. Justice NORTH would
not say that this decision was wrong (although rendered by
-the unlucky Vice Chancellor MALINS) but preferred to find a
-distinction in the use of the word "sum " in Mytton v. Mytton.
If, however, the distinction was too fine a one (as it appears
-to us) the learned judge had ample authority for holding the
legacy specific: McClellan v. Clark, 5o L. T. (N. S.) 616;
Page v. Young, L. R. 19 Eq. 501, and others to the same
point. Upon the will itself, independent of the authorities, the
'legacy was clearly specific.
Trust-Gift by will in tursuance of5romnise.
We read with interest the decision in Hofner's Estate, 161
Pa. 33 1. Testatrix by last will left a legacy to a church, and
died May 26, 1892, two days after the execution of the will.
"There was a prior will dated December I, 1892, a codicil to
which, executed April 12, 1888, contained an identical gift.
It appeared in evidence that testatrix had received a legacy
-from her sister Elizabeth in 1888, who had intended to leave
Ier property to the church, but changed her mind and left
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'her property to testatrix, receiving her promise that she would
never use it but would dispose of it according to Elizabeth's
wishes. The promise was made after the execution of the will.
The Supreme Court found the Orphans' Court of Philadel-
phia County in error in holding that, as the legacy was iden-
tical with that in the codicil, the legacy was not avoided by
the Act of April 26, 1855, P. L. 332. The first and last will
'were entirely inconsistent.
The gift, however, was sustained on the ground that the
-promise of testatrix to her sister raised a trust in favor of the
object, in favor of which the will would have been changed
'but for that promise. As Justice DEAN would put it upon the
-principle of the Golden Rule, and although there was no fraud
on the part of testatrix, there was none the less a trust.
Justice MITCHELL, in dissenting, vigorously remarks: "I do
not understand that equity, even under the benign adminis-
tration of the longest footed chancellor, undertakes to enforce
-moral obligations in the length and breadth of the Golden
Rule, and it is important that we should keep its boundaries
carefully marked. If it was to be enforced as an obligation,
'the church should be required to file its bill, prove the con-
sideration, the contract or trust, and the failure to perform as
in other cases."
The decision of the court appears to have been a good
natured effort to save the gift to the church. But the theory
.is hardly sustained by the evidence. There is absolutely
nothing to show that Elizabeth even intended to alter her will
when the promise was made.
O-r;pans' Court-Religious use.
We are tempted to go back to Knight's Estate, 159 Pa. 500,
and note the decided enlargement of the definition of a relig-
ious use as understood by the law of Pennsylvania. Testator
'left $iooo to the Friendship Liberal League, organized under
the General Incorporation Act of April 29, 1874, "for the
purpose of uniting the persons so to be incorporated socially,
for the improvement of their intellectual and moral condition
by the dissemination of scientific truths by means of literature,
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music, lecture and debate." Its meetings were held on Sun-
day and it was dependent on the voluntary gifts of members
and sympathizers. One witness testified that the League was
"opposed to all isms." Another who had attended a Sunday
lecture, said: "It was a lecture against the Christian religion.
A discussion followed in the same spirit." A third testified that
the object of the League was "the investigation of truth," and
this was till the light thrown upon its purposes. It was held
to be a charitable use within the meaning of the Act of
April 26, 1855, § II, P. L. 332, by the Orphans' Court of
Philadelphia County, 2 Dist. Rep. 523, chiefly because its
purpose as set forth in the qharter was the dissemination of
scientific truth to all who wished to avail themselves of its
privileges. Hence, it was a charity in the sense that a public
school is a charity: Episcopal Academy v. Phila., 150 Pa. 565.
The gift therefore failed, the will having been executed within
one month of testator's death. The language of the Supreme
Court in affirming the decree is not framed with the same
caution as was exercised by the learned court below, but
would seem to imply that this was a religious as well as a
charitable gift.
"In its broadest sense religion comprehends all systems of
belief in the existence of being superior to and capable of
exercising an influence for good or evil upon the human race."
This is a definition broad enough to cover the worship of his
satanic majesty and, indeed, the court cites among its examples
the worship of idols and the religion of the North American
Indians.
We understand that the court considered itself placed in a
dilemna since any other interpretation would have made § I I,
of the Act of 1855, discriminate against Christianity. But
the exceedingly broad language of the court in this instance-
may compel them in future cases calling for an application
of the cy pres doctrine to give effect to gifts anything but
religious.
We do not look for such a result, but believe that if such a
case arises, the court will distinguish this case upon the same
grounds as the Orphans' Court, and that the sound doctrine-
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in Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. 465, where a gift to "The
Infidel Society in Philadelphia," hereafter to be incorporated
was held void, will n6t be abandoned.
If a league is to be regarded as "religious" simply because
it airs its peculiar views upon the first day of the week, And
has some vague moral or immoral purpose which represents
its intentions, then surely there can be no use for the word
religious in the Act of 1855 , since its meaning is hopelessly
indefinite.
W. H. L.
EQUITY.
Declaration of tntst.
The endorsement of notes and mortgages to one "for the
use of" another is sufficient to create a trust and does not
pass the legal title to the beneficiary, even though the nature
of the trust is not stated: Collins v. Phillips et al., 59 N. W.
Rep. (Iowa) 40.
Trustee-Statute of Limitations.
The rule that the statute of limitations does not begin to run
in favor of a trustee until he has openly repudiated the trust,
was recently invoked in the Appellate Court of New York in a
suit against a self-constituted liquidating partner, but the court
held that this rule applied only to cases of actual, express and
subsisting trusts, and was therefore not applicable to the case
of a liquidating partner, whose agency is not a direct trust.
If any trust had been raised here by implication or construc-
tion from wrong-dealing, the statute began to run from the
date of the wrong: Gilmore v. Ham, 36 N. E.' Rep. 826.
He who comes into equity imust do so with clean hands.
"No polluted hand shall touch the pure fountains of justice."
The principle here embodied is the chief foundation stone of the
relief afforded by courts of equity and is called into requisition
more often, perhaps, than any other. The Supreme Court of
Indiana had occasion to rely upon it recently in the case of
Brown v. First National Bank of Columbia, reported in 37 N. E.
Rep. 158. From the facts it appeared that a justice of the
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peace (Brown) before whom an affidavit had been filed charg-
ing with larceny a person who had fled the jurisdiction, entered
into an agreement with the plaintiff, (the bank), that if he-
secured the fugitive's arrest and the return of the stolen
property he should receive a percentage of the latter. He did
succeed in arresting the thief and in securing the property, and
this suit was brought to compel the bank to pay him the com-
pensation agreed upon. The court decided that the agreement
was void as against public policy regardless of the good faith
of the parties thereto, and notwithstanding the fact that the
affidavit was not copied into the justice's docket, but was in
fact taken from his office, and that no warrant was issued by
him upon it. "All agreements relating to proceedings in the
courts, civil or 6riminal, which may involve anything incon-
sistent with the full and impartial course of justice therein are
void though there are no open charges of corruption."
The agreement thus being void, the bank was not estopped
from setting up such a defence even though it had received
the benefits of the transaction.
Whether equity will refuse or grant its aid in such cases.
seems to depend upon whether or not the terms of the agree-
ment must be appealed to and relied upon: See Gray v.
Oxnard Bros., 59 Hun. 387, and the celebrated case of
Sharp v. Taylor, 2 Phil. Ch. 8oi.
Following trust funds.
We are reminded of the well-known case of Farmers' and
Mechanics' Bank v. King, 57 Pa. 202, by a late decision of
the Supreme Court of South Dakota, Kimmel v. Dickson,
reported in 58 N. W. Rep. 56i..
Kimmel had given to a certain bank a sum of money for a
purpose which was recited in the receipt it gave him in return,
namely, that the bank should pay it over td a designated
third person when he presented to it a proper deed, duly
executed, conveying to the plaintiff a certain piece of land for
which the latter had contracted. Subsequently, and before
any part of this plan was carried out, the bank failed and a
receiver (Dickson) was appointed. Kimmel now sought to
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recover his money, and Dickson denied his right on the
ground that the bank had given him credit for the sum as a.
deposit, and had mingled the money with its own. This,
however, had been done without the plaintiff's knowledge, and
the court was very clear that it did not change the character
of the transaction. The'money so deposited, said the court,.
was plainly a trust fund and did not become assets or pass to
the receiver. Being a trust fund Kimmel was entitled to
follow it into the receiver's hands. The court, therefore,
directed the receiver to pay it over to him.
Fraud-Szciency of averments of in the bill.
Upon a demurrer to a bill in which the complainant (a.
creditor) based his right to recover upon' the fraud of the
defendant the Supreme Court of Alabama recently gave an
opinion upon the sufficiency of allegations in a bill when
charging fraud.
The bill alleged that the defendant had conveyed all his
property to his minor children to defraud future creditors; that
he withheld the deeds from record for nearly a year, conceal-
ing their existence fr6m complainant till after the debt was
created; that he remained in possession and held himself out
to complainant as the owner of the property; that he had
given a mortgage on it to one who knew of his failing condi-
tion; and finally that he had remained in possession consum-
ing and disposing of the property and thereby defrauding the
complainant. The court overruled the demurrer and laid
down the rule broadly that general averments of facts from
which unexplained a conclusion of fraud arises are sufficient;
and stated that the test in such cases was whether the aver-
ments of matters essential to the right of recovery were-
sufficient to notify the defendant that the bona fides of the
transaction was assailed and to put in issue its validity:
Williams v. Spragins, 15 So. Rep. 247.
Practice and pleading-Multifarioesness.
The rules of practice and pleading in equity are well settled,.
but occasionally attempts are made to break away from them.
In the case of Burnham v. Dillon, reported in 59 N. W. Rep.
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